On May 22,
1995, former State Representative Pat Tiberi, now a Congressman to the United States House
of Representatives, introduced House Bill 350 to make changes in the laws pertaining to
tort and other civil actions.
The bill was
sent to the House Select Committee on Civil Justice and the House Select Committee was
then divided into the Reform Subcommittee on Claim Accountability; the Subcommittee on
Limitations of Damages, and the Subcommittee on Wrongful Death, Product Liability, and
Medical Malpractice. Each Subcommittee held
extensive hearings and reported back to the House Select Committee on Civil Justice and in
January, 1996, a substitute bill was reported out. The
bill was amended and passed the Ohio House of Representatives on February 7, 1996 by a
vote of 54 – 44.
House Bill
350 was then referred to the Ohio Senate and was sent to the Senate Select Committee on
Civil Justice. The Senate Committee
substituted the bill and reported it out on May 29, 1996.
House Bill 350 passed the Ohio Senate on May 29, 1996 by a vote of 20 – 13.
The bill
then went to a Conference Committee that met over the Summer. The Conference Report was agreed to by the House
and the Senate in September, 1996 and was signed by the Governor on October 28, 1996. House Bill 350 became effective on January 27,
1997. The following were the major provisions
included in House Bill 350 (121st):
The
non-economic damage cap provided that the amount of non-economic damages recoverable was
not to exceed the greater of $250,000, or an amount equal to three times the
plaintiff’s economic damages, up to a maximum of $500,000. If the non-economic damages are for permanent and
severe pain and suffering resulting from permanent and substantial physical disfigurement,
deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a major bodily function, or permanent
physical injury that prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for
himself or herself, then non-economic damages may be awarded up to $1 million or $35,000
per year times the plaintiff’s expected life. If
the plaintiff meets the criteria specified above, and the defendant was convicted of a
felony based on the same facts that are the proximate cause of injury, non-economic
damages is to be unlimited.
The punitive
damages cap prohibited the court from entering judgment for punitive damages in excess of
three times the amount of the compensatory damages warded to the plaintiff from that
defendant or $100,000, whichever is lesser, for individuals and small business; the court
may award up to three times the compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater,
for large employers with more than 25 full-time, permanent employees.
Punitive
damage caps do not come into play if the defendant files with the court, a certified
judgment, judgment entries, or other evidence showing that punitive damages have already
been awarded and collected. In addition, a
requirement was included that in order to avoid an award of punitive damages, the
aggregate of those punitive or exemplary damages must exceed $100,000, or in the case of a
large employer, $250,000.
The
Conference Committee Report allowed the trier of fact in a tort action to consider
relevant collateral benefits, but only if there is no right of subrogation attached to the
collateral benefit or if the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s spouse had not paid a
premium for the insurance. The bill modified
the definition of collateral benefits to specifically include workers’compensation
benefits.
Set a six
year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims.
The bill
abolished joint and several liability in tort actions except for defendants who are more
than 50% at fault. A defendant determined to
be more than 50% at fault is jointly and severally liable only for a plaintiff’s
economic damages.
The
Conference Report incorporated more stringent standards regulating frivolous conduct which
may occur and permits judges to impose penalties for frivolous conduct on their own
initiative. Under the former law, frivolous
conduct sanction required the motion of a party to the civil action.
Allowed
evidence that a person was not wearing a seat belt to be presented in tort actions.
In these
areas, the Conference Report makes actions for negligence on the part of hospitals subject
to a one year statute of limitations; limit the liability of hospitals under an ostensible
agency theory for the acts of independent medical practitioners; and establish a
requirement for the filing of a certificate of merit by a plaintiff in medical malpractice
actions. This requirement was recently struck down by the court as an unconstitutional
dealing with the regulation of pleadings by the legislature; the language was altered in
the Conference Report in order to withstand a constitutional challenge.
In November, 1997, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and the Ohio AFL-CIO asked the Ohio Supreme Court to examine the constitutionality of House Bill 350 in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward. The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and the Ohio AFL-CIO alleged that many of the provisions contained in House Bill 350 re-enacted law that had already been ruled unconstitutional or invalid by the Court, and that the Ohio General Assembly was refusing to be bound by those decisions.
On August
16, 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down Ohio’s tort reform law as
unconstitutional. In a 4 - 3 decision, the
Court held that the passage of House Bill 350 (121st) takes judicial power away from the
courts in violation of the Ohio doctrine of separation of powers. The Court also held that the bill includes more
than one subject in violation of the “one-subject” provision of the Ohio
Constitution.
House Bill 350, which was effective January 27, 1997, limited the type of civil cases which can be filed and the conditions for recovery; established procedural and evidentiary rules for such litigation; and limited the amount injured parties can recover in damages.
Justice Alice Robie Resnick wrote the majority opinion and Justices Andrew Douglas, Francis E. Sweeney Sr. and Paul E. Pfeifer concurred. Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, joined by Justices Deborah Cook and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, wrote the dissenting opinion.
Resnick wrote “the General Assembly has chosen to circumvent our mandates, while attempting to establish itself as the final arbiter of the validity of its own legislation....It has boldly seized the power of constitutional adjudication, appropriated the authority to establish rules of court and overrule judicial declarations of unconstitutionality.”
The
following provisions in law were among those struck down by the decision:
1.
Establishing no
limit on economic damages from an injury or accident for medical bills, lost wages or
other expenses.
2.
Setting a cap on
noneconomic damages of $250,000 or three times the amount of economic damages up to
$5000,000, except in cases of severe injury or loss of limb, in which they can be up to $1
million or 35,000 times the number of years remaining in the victim’s expected life.
3.
Limiting punitive
damages to $100,000 or $250,000 for businesses with more than 25 employees.
4.
Providing a 15 year
limit for filing product liability claims.
5.
Allowing
information that a person was not wearing a seat belt to be admissible as evidence.
6.
Reducing to two
years the limit for filing discrimination cases.
7.
Granting coaches
and officials immunity from civil liability involving the death or injury of a player in
their sports program..
The Supreme Court decision was a
victory for trial attorneys, union members and consumer advocates who felt that such
restrictions deprived injured parties from being compensated fairly for their losses.